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Changxi Li1, Fenghua He1, Hongsheng Qi2, and Daizhan Cheng2
Abstract— Consider a multiplayer game, and assume a
system level objective function, which the system wants to
optimize, is given. This paper aims at accomplishing this goal
via potential game theory when players can only get part of
other players’ information. The technique is designing a set of
local information based utility functions, which guarantee that
the designed game is potential, with the system level objective
function its potential function. First, the existence of local
information based utility functions can be verified by checking
whether the corresponding linear equations have a solution.
Then an algorithm is proposed to calculate the local information
based utility functions when the utility design equations have
solutions. Finally, consensus problem of multiagent system is
considered to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
design procedure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game-theoretical control has drawn considerable attention
in recent years due to its widespread applications. Some
representative works include: (i) consensus/synchronization
of multi-agent systems [1]; (ii) distributed optimization [2],
[3]; (iii) control in wireless networks; (iv) optimization in
energy [4] and transportation networks [5], [6], just to name
a few.
The content of game-theoretical control is using game
theory to solve control problems in interacting setting, such
as multiagent systems [2], [3]. Addressing such issues via
game theory needs two steps. The first step is to view the
agent as an intelligent rational decision-maker in a game
with defining a set of available actions and utility function
for every player. The second step is to specify a learning
rule for the designed game so that the agents can reach
a desirable situation, e.g., a Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
there are two basic tasks in game-theoretic control: utility
design and learning rule design [7]. Utility functions describe
components’ incentives, and learning rules mean how each
player processes its available information to formulate a
decision.
Compared with traditional methods, the advantage of
game-theoretical control is that it provides a modularized
design architecture, i.e. we can design utility functions and
*This work is supported partly by the National Natural Science Foun-
dation of China (NSFC) under Grants 61473099, 61773371, 61733018 and
61333001.
1 Changxi Li and Fenghua He are with Harbin Institute of Tech-
nology, Harbin 150001, P. R. China changxi1989@163.com,
hefenghua@hit.edu.cn
2 Hongsheng Qi and Daizhan Cheng are with Key Laboratory
of Systems and Control, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Sci-
ences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, P. R. China
qihongsh@amss.ac.cn, dcheng@iss.ac.cn
Corresponding author: Fenghua He. Tel.: +86 0451-86402947; fax.: +86
0451-86414580.
learning rules separately [8]. The separation is described as
an hourglass architecture in [7], which is shown in Fig. 1.
When designing games, one idea is to make sure that the
Learning Design
Potential Game
Utility Design
Fig. 1. Hourglass Architecture of Game-Theoretical Control
designed game falls under some special category games,
such as potential games [9]. One advantage of designing
the game as potential game is that there are a variety of
learning rules which lead to a Nash equilibrium, e.g. myopic
best response, log-liner learning, and fictitious play [10]-
[12]. Several papers have devoted to potential game based
design in distributed control [13]-[15]. Other game design
methods include wonderful life utility design [16], Shapley
value utility design [17], congestion game based design
[18], etc. However most of the above works provide no
systematic methods on designing local information based
utility functions. Here local information means that players
can only get part of other players’ information when they
play the designed game, such as networked game.
This paper focuses on providing a systematic method
for designing finite potential game using local information.
As far as we know, the most relevant works are [2] and
[19]. But our work is different to theirs. [2] provided a
systematic methodology for designing potential games with
continuous action sets, where the utility functions are local
information based. It showed that for any given system
level objective function, there exists at least one method
to design the local information based utility functions [2].
However, when we turn to games with finite action sets,
the existence is not guaranteed. As for [19], it presented
a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
local information based utility functions. But no systematic
method is provided for designing local information based
utility functions. Furthermore, the learning rule used in [19]
is better reply. Using better reply, local information based
potential game can converge to a Nash equilibrium, but may
not a maximum point of the system objective function.
The contributions of this paper are threefold: (i) A nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the existence of local
information based utility functions is obtained, which can
be verified by checking whether the corresponding linear
equations have solutions. (ii) A method for designing finite
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potential game using local information is presented when the
linear equations have a solution. (iii) An example on con-
sensus problem is provided to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the design procedure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides some preliminaries, including semi-tensor product
(STP) of matrices, game theory, and problem description.
Section III considers the design of potential game using
local-based information. Section IV considers application of
the design method to consensus problem. A brief conclusion
is given in Section V.
Notations: Rn is denoted by the Euclidean space of all
real n-vectors. Mm×n is the set of m × n real matri-
ces. 1` = (1, 1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
`
)T . Im ∈ Mm×m is the m × m-
dimensional identity matrix. 0m×n ∈Mm×m is the m×m-
dimensional zero matrix. Dk := {1, 2, · · · , k} , k ≥ 2. δin
is denoted by the i-th column of the identity matrix In.
Col(M) (Row(M)) is the set of columns (rows) of M .
The transposition of matrix A ∈ Mm×n is denoted by
AT ∈ Mn×m. Span{V1, · · · , Vs} is the subspace spanned
by {Vi | Vi ∈ Rn, i = 1, · · · , s}.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Semi-tensor Product of Matrices
The basic tool used in this paper is STP of matrices. We
give a brief survey on STP of matrices. Please refer to [20]
for more details.
Definition 2.1: [20] Suppose A ∈ Mm×n, B ∈ Mp×q ,
and l be the least common multiple of n and p. The STP of
A and B is defined by
AnB :=
(
A⊗ Il/n
) (
B ⊗ Il/p
) ∈Mml/n×ql/p,
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
Assume i ∈ Dk. By identifying i ∼ δik we call δik the
vector form of integer i. A function f :
∏n
i=1Dki → R is
called a mix-valued pseudo-logical function.
Definition 2.2: [20] Let f :
∏n
i=1Dki → R be a mix-
valued pseudo-logical function. Then there exists a unique
row vector Mf ∈ Rk, such that
f(x1, · · · , xn) = Mf nni=1 xi.
Mf is called the structure vector of f , and k =
n∏
i=1
ki.
B. Potential Game
A finite non-cooperative game is a triple G =
{N, {Si}i∈N , {ci}i∈N}, where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the
set of players, Si = {1, 2, · · · , ki} is the set of strategies
of player i for every i ∈ N , and ci : S → R is the
utility function of player i, with S :=
∏n
i=1 Si being the
strategy profile of the game. Let S−i :=
∏
j 6=i Sj be the
set of partial strategy profiles other than player i. Denote
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] by set of form finite games with |N | = n,
|Si| = ki, i = 1, · · · , n.
Using the vector expression of strategies, the utility func-
tion can be expressed as
ci(x) = Vi nnj=1 xj ,
where xi ∈ Si, and Vi ∈ Rk is called the structure vector of
ci, k =
∏n
i=1 ki.
The concept of potential game was firstly proposed by
Rosenthal [21], whose definition is as follows:
Definition 2.3: A finite game G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is a
potential game if there exists a function P : S → R, such
that for every player i ∈ N and every s−i ∈ S−i
ci(xi, s
−i)− ci(yi, s−i) = P (xi, s−i)− P (yi, s−i),
∀xi, yi ∈ Si,
where P is called the potential function of G.
The following Lemma is obvious according to Definition
2.3.
Lemma 2.4: [22] A finite game G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is
potential if and only if there exist functions di : S−i →
R, i ∈ N such that for every x ∈ S
P (x) = ci(x)− di(x−i), ∀i ∈ N, (1)
where P (x) is the potential function, and x−i ∈ S−i.
C. Problem Setup
Consider a multi-player game G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] played
on the network, which is called networked game (NG). In
fact every player can only obtain its neighbours’ information
when playing game G. The neighbors of player i is denoted
by U(i), which is defined as follows,
U(i) = {j ∈ N |i can communicate with j}.
Suppose a system level objective function φ(x) is given,
where x ∈ S. The system wants to optimize the objective
function, while all players can only obtain its neighbours
information. The optimization problem can be described as
max φ(x1, x2, · · · , xn)
s.t. ci(x) = ci(xU(i), xi),
xi ∈ Si,∀i ∈ N,
where xU(i) = {xj}j∈U(i).
To solve this optimization problem, the idea is to design
a potential game in which the utility function of every
player only depends on its neighbours’ information, and the
potential function of the designed game is φ(x). Then using
proper learning algorithm, such as logit learning [10], play-
ers’ behavior converges to a strategy profile that maximize
the objective function.
III. POTENTIAL GAME DESIGN USING LOCAL-BASED
INFORMATION
A. Utility Design Using Local Information
We consider the design of potential game using local
information in this subsection. Before designing the game,
an operator ΓU , called the U -drawing matrix, is necessary,
where U ⊂ N is a group of players in the game G ∈
G[n;k1,··· ,kn]. Set
ΓU := ⊗ni=1γi
where
γi :=
{
Iki , i ∈ U
1Tki , otherwise.
The U -drawing matrix is used to “draw” the strategies of
players in U from N [19]:
nj∈Uxj = ΓU nnj=1 xj ,
where xi ∈ Si is the strategy of player i. Particularly, Γ−i :=
ΓN\{i}, where N\{i} is the set of players except player i.
Theorem 3.1: Consider a utility-adjustable networked
game G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] with objective function φ(x)
φ(x) = V φ nnj=1 xj .
Then local information based utility function can be designed
if and only if all the following equations have a solution
Ti · ξi = (V φ)T, (2)
where Ti = [ΓTNi ,Γ
T
−i], ξi = [(ξ
1
i )
T, (ξ2i )
T]T, ξ1i ∈ RkNi ,
ξ2i ∈ Rk−i , kNi =
∏
j∈Ni kj , k−i =
∏
j 6=i kj , and Ni =
U(i) ∪ {i}, ∀i ∈ N .
Moreover if the solution ξi,∀i ∈ N exists, the local
information based utility function of player i is
ci(x) = (ξ
1
i )
TΓNi nnj=1 xj ,∀i ∈ N. (3)
Proof: If the utility function of the networked game G is
local information-based, then we have
ci(x) = Vi nj∈Ni xj = ViΓNi nnj=1 xj .
Rewrite (1) into vector form, and substituting (3) into (1)
yields
V φ nnl=1 xl = Vi nj∈Ni xj − V di nj 6=i xj ,
= ViΓNi nnj=1 xj − V di Γ−i nnj=1 xj ,
where V φ and V di are the structure vectors of φ and di,
respectively.
Since xi ∈ ∆kl , i ∈ N are arbitrary, we have
V φ = ViΓNi − V di Γ−i,∀i ∈ N, (4)
which is equivalent to (2).
If the solution ξi exists, then we have
Vi = (ξ
1
i )
T, ∀i ∈ N,
which verifies equation (3).
2
Equations (2) are called utility design equations, and
Ti,∀i ∈ N are called utility design matrices.
B. Solving Utility Design Equations
In this subsection we first explore some properties of
utility design equations. Then we design an algorithm to
calculate solutions of utility design equations equations when
the solutions exist.
Set
ΛNi := ⊗
j∈Ni
Λj , ΥNi := ⊗
j 6=i
Υj ,
where
Λj :=
{
1kj , j = i
Ikj , j ∈ U(i)
, Υj :=
{
1kj , j /∈ Ni
Ikj , j ∈ U(i)
.
Denote by Hi = [ΛTNi ,−ΥTNi ]T,∀i ∈ N. Let Hi =
Span Col(Hi),∀i ∈ N.
Theorem 3.2: Let Ti be the utility design matrix of player
i in (2). Then
Span Row(Ti) = H⊥i ,∀i ∈ N. (5)
In other words, every column of Hi is a solution of Tix = 0.
And
rank(Ti) = kNi − kU(i),
where kNi =
∏
j∈Ni kj , and kU(i) =
∏
j∈U(i) kj
Proof: We omit the detailed proof due to the space limitation.
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Using Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we have the follow-
ing results:
Corollary 3.3: Consider a utility-adjustable networked
game G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] with objective function φ(x)
φ(x) = V φ nnj=1 xj .
Then the following four statements are equivalent.
(i) The local information based utility functions can
be designed.
(ii) The following equations have a solution
Ti · ξi = (V φ)T,∀i ∈ N.
(iii) Suppose Ti is defined in (2). Then,
rank[Ti, (V
φ)T] = kNi − kU(i),∀i ∈ N. (6)
(iv)
(V φ)T ∈
n⋂
i=1
Span Col(Ti).
Proof: (i)⇔(ii): It is obvious using Theorem 3.1.
(ii)⇔(iii): From linear algebra we know that condition (6)
is the necessary and sufficient condition for equation (2) to
have solutions.
(iii)⇔(iv): From Theorem 3.2 one sees that
rank(Ti) = kNi − kU(i).
Combining equation (6) we have the following result
(V φ)T ∈ Span Col(Ti),∀i ∈ N,
which is equivalent to statement (iv). It is obvious that (iv)
implies (iii).
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In the following we design an algorithm to calculate the
local information based utility function for each player when
equation (2) has solutions.
Algorithm 3.4: • Construct Ti and ΛNi for each i ∈ N.
• Determine ξi ∈ RkNi+k−i as
ξi := (T
T
i Ti)
−1TTi (V
φ)T. (7)
• Define ξ1i as the sub-vector of the first kNi elements
of ξi. Using (3), the general form of Vi, i ∈ N are
calculated as follows
Vi = (ΛNiζi + ξ
1
i )
T,
where ζi is an arbitrary vector in RkU(i) .
Using Algorithm 3.4, the local information based utility
function of player i is
ci(x) = Vi nj∈Ni xj
= (ΛNiζi + ξ
1
i )
T n
j∈Ni
xj ,∀i ∈ N.
Remark 3.5: 1) The computation complexity of Algo-
rithm 3.4 is mainly dependent on the caculation of
(7), where the dimension of Ti is (kNi + k−i) × k.
It shows that the smaller the number of the neighbors
is, the lower the computational complexity is. Further
investigation for reducing the computation complexity
of Algorithm 3.4 is necessary.
2) The method proposed in this paper can also be applied
to design state-based potential game [23] with local
information based utilities.
C. Selecting Proper Learning Rule
After designing the utility function, another thing to be
considered is selecting proper learning algorithm in potential
games. The learning algorithm should ensure that players’
behavior converges to a stategy profile that maximize the
objective function using local information. The logit learning,
which is shown as follows, satisfies the above demands:
• At each period t, player i ∈ N is chosen with proba-
bility 1/n and allowed to update its strategy;
• At time t, the updating player i selects a strategy xi ∈
Si according to the following probability
Pr(xi(t) = xi) =
exp{βci(xi, x−i(t− 1))}∑
yi∈Si
exp{βci(yi, x−i(t− 1))}
where β ≥ 0 is exploration parameter.
• All other players repeat their previous actions, i.e.,
x−i(t) = x−i(t− 1), where x−i(t) ∈ S−i.
Theorem 3.6: [10] Consider a repeated potential game
G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] with potential function P (x) where all
player use logit learning. The stationary distribution µβ ∈
∆(S) is
µβ(x) =
exp{βP (x)}∑
y∈S
exp{βP (y)} (8)
where ∆(S) is the set of probability distributions over S.
Moreover, the set of stochastically stable states is equal to
the set of maximizers of P , where a state x ∈ S is called
stochastically stable if limβ→∞ µβ(x) > 0.
Remark 3.7: Since for local information-based potential
game we have ci(x) = ci(xU(i)). Using the above logit
learning rule, the local information-based potential game will
maximize the potential function P (x) with arbitrarily high
probability when β is sufficiently large. For general potential
game if only the local information is allowed to use, the
result is not assured. Here general potential game is potential
game whose utility functions are not local information based.
IV. APPLICATION: CONSENSUS PROBLEM
In this section we deal with consensus problem using the
above results.
Consider a multi-agent system with a system level objec-
tive function φ : S → R. The goal of the multi-agent system
is to maximum the objective function. Due to its mobility
limitations, agent can only select strategies from a restricted
strategy set. For example, a robot in 2-D environment can
only move to a position within a radius of its current location.
Agent can communicate with its neighbors, which means
that at each period the agent can only observe its neighbors’
strategies.
A question is: If the player can only select strategies
from a restricted strategy set, can the local information-
based potential game maximize the objective function when
β is sufficiently large using logit learning. Unfortunately, the
answer is no. But binary restrictive logit learning, which
was introduced in [1], can accomplish the aim. Denote
Ri(xi(t−1)) ⊂ Si by the set of strategies available to player
i at time t. The binary restrictive logit learning is as follows:
• At each period t, player i ∈ N is chosen with proba-
bility 1/n and allowed to update its strategy;
• At time t, the updating player i selects a trial strategy
xti from Ri(xi(t − 1)) according to the following
probability
Pr(xti = xi) = 1/wi, for xi ∈ Ri(xi(t−1))\xi(t−1),
Pr(xti = xi(t− 1)) = 1− ((|Ri(xi(t− 1))| − 1)/wi),
where wi = maxxi∈Si |Ri(xi)|.
• After selecting a trial strategy xti, player i chooses its
strategy xi(t) as follows:
Pr(xi(t) = xti) =
exp{βci(xti, x−i(t− 1))}
M
,
Pr(xi(t) = xi(t− 1)) = exp{βci(x(t− 1))}
M
,
(9)
where β ≥ 0 is exploration parameter, and
M = exp{βci(xti, x−i(t− 1))}+ exp{βci(x(t− 1))}.
• All other players repeat their previous actions, i.e.,
x−i(t) = x−i(t− 1), where x−i(t) ∈ S−i.
If the restricted strategy sets satisfy the following condi-
tions
1) Reversibility:
xi ∈ Ri(yi)⇔ yi ∈ Ri(xi),∀xi, yi ∈ Si,∀i ∈ N.
2) Feasibility: For any two strategies x1i , x
m
i ∈ Si, there
exists a series of strategies x1i → x2i → · · · → xmi
such that xji ∈ Ri(xj−1i ), j = 2, · · · ,m.
Then using the above binary restrictive logit learning po-
tential game with restricted strategy sets will maximize
its potential function P (x) with arbitrarily high probability
when β is sufficiently large [1].
Example 4.1: Consider a multi-agent system with three
agents N = {1, 2, 3}. The system level goal is that all agents
gather at point (3, 3) in 2-D environment, such as a room.
Each agent has a strategy set Si = {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3}.
Due to its mobility limitations, every agent can only move
to a position within a radius 1 of its current location, and
there is an obstacle in (2, 2), as shown in Fig. 2. The
communication graph is time-invariant, which is shown in
red line. Agent 1 can only communicate with agent 2. Agent
2 can communicate with agent 1 and 2. Agent 3 can only
communicate with agent 2.
Obstacle
1
2
3
Agent 3
3
Agent 2
Agent 1 Destination
a
b
2
Fig. 2. Initial Configuration and Network Graph of Example 4.1
a). Vector expression of strategies
Identify
δi3δ
j
3 ∼ (i, j), ∀i, j = 1, 2, 3.
The system level objective function can be described as
φ(x) := |{i|xi(t) = (3, 3)}|, (10)
where xi(t) ∈ Si, i ∈ N . Using the vector expression of
strategies, the structure vector of φ can be calculated as
V φ =
8∑
i=1
8∑
j=1
(δ99 ⊗ δi9 ⊗ δj9 + δi9 ⊗ δ99 ⊗ δj9 + δi9 ⊗ δj9 ⊗ δ99)T
+
8∑
i=1
(δi9 ⊗ δ99 ⊗ δ99 + δ99 ⊗ δi9 ⊗ δ99 + δ99 ⊗ δ99 ⊗ δi9)T
+(δ99 ⊗ δ99 ⊗ δ99)T.
b). Local information based utility design
Set
Γ =
 T1 0729×810 0729×1620729×162 T2 0729×162
0729×162 0729×810 T2
 ,
where T1 = [I81 ⊗ 19,19 ⊗ I81], T2 = [I729, I9 ⊗ 19 ⊗ I9],
and T3 = [19 ⊗ I81, I81 ⊗ 19].
We can verify that the following equation has solutions
Γ · ξ = 13 ⊗ (V φ)T.
According to Theorem 3.1, the local information based utility
function is designable. The designed local information based
utility function has the following form:
ci(x) = Vi nj∈Ni xj , i = 1, 2, 3,
where N1 = {1, 2}, N2 = {1, 2, 3}, and N3 = {2, 3}.
Using (3), the general form of Vi, i = 1, 2, 3 are calculated
as follows
V T1 = (19 ⊗ I9) · ζ1 + [0.07, 0.02, 0.02,−0.04,
4.8, 2.8, · · · , 1, 1, 2] ∈ R81;
V T2 = (I9 ⊗ 19 ⊗ I9) · ζ2 + [1.76,−1,−2.2,−1,
2.3, 3.1, · · · , 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] ∈ R729;
V T3 = (I9 ⊗ 19) · ζ3 + [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
−2.6,−2.6, · · · , 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2] ∈ R81,
where ζ1 ∈ R9, ζ2 ∈ R81, and ζ3 ∈ R9 are arbitrary vectors.
c). Simulation results
The initial configuration of all agents is shown in Fig. 2.
Let ζ1 = 19, ζ2 = 181, and ζ3 = 19. Using binary restrictive
logit learning with parameter β = 0.02t, we have the
following simulation results. As β → ∞ (t → ∞), local
information based potential game converges to an equilib-
rium point which maximizes the potential function. Then
all agents agree to stay at destination (3, 3) forever, which
are shown in Fig. 3-Fig.5. Here xi(t) = (ai(t), bi(t)), i =
1, 2, 3.
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Fig. 3. Evolution of Agent 1’s Position of Example 4.1
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Fig. 4. Evolution of Agent 2’s Position of Example 4.1
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the design of potential game us-
ing local information. We firstly present a necessary and
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Fig. 5. Evolution of Agent 3’s Position of Example 4.1
sufficient condition for the existence of local information
based utility functions, which can be verified by checking
whether a series of linear equations have a solution. Local
information based utility functions can be designed using the
solutions when the linear equations have solutions. Then a
consensus problem is used to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed design approach.
Open and interesting questions for further investigations
include: If the utility functions cannot be designed as a
potential game using local information, can we design a near-
potential game [24]? To maximize the system level objective
function, how “near” the designed game should be for a given
learning rule?
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